Abstract
This paper examines intentionality in artificial intelligence(s) from a variety of positions offered by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of the Power of Judgment. Insofar as the work, to dubious success, sets out to unite the theoretical knowledge of natural law with the practical knowledge of moral law; or rather, nature with human freedom, it illustrates a tension in Kant’s system only intensified by current developments in artificial intelligence: can we reconcile the physical mechanisms of nature (whether in neuroscience or quantum physics) with the intentional causality experienced by rational beings such as ourselves? If the answer is yes, in that the former will eventually explain the latter, then we have landed in the domain of Churchland’s eliminative materialism. Such a physicalist picture not only strengthens the odds of the possibility of artificial general intelligence, but also reduces philosophical discussions of intentionality and ethics to an, at best, temporary solution to a problem that will be fixed by science. If, as Kant offers, the latter can explain the former, in that we must practically posit nature as arising in unity with our reason and notion of the moral good (such that we cannot know the reasons why nature is the way it is, or whether or not it has a purpose, but must think it as having reasons and purposes in order to strengthen our practical capacities), then this means we necessarily must view artificial intelligence as in some way aligned with our own status as intentional beings.
Details
Presentation Type
Paper Presentation in a Themed Session
Theme
KEYWORDS
Kant, Teleology, Intentionality, Normativity, Sellars, Churchland, Eliminative Materialism
